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CHAPTER l. INTRODUCTION 
In the past ten years many of the world 's centra lly planned economies have 
experienced substantial institutional changes. During the 1990s about 30 countries in Eastern 
Europe, the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Asia started the process of transition from a 
planned to a market-oriented economy. Even in countries that are sti ll considered sociali st 
(communist), e.g. China and Vietnam, the mechanism of economic coordination has shifted 
to a great extent from state intervention to market allocation. The main argument in favor of 
transition was a desire to put the socialjst countries on the path of economic growth. [twas 
assumed that the shift of property rights from state to private hands and the shift of allocation 
mechanism from state to free market wou ld soon enhance saving rates and capital formation 
and contribute to high growth rates . A criti cal factor behind privatization is the well-
documented poor performance of public enterprises. Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) is 
a good source of references for the studies of public and private firms around the world. In 
the last decade thousands of state firms in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Western and Eastern 
Europe were privatized. 
Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) identified two strategies for privatization. The 
first strategy is the sale of individual enterprises or their shares for cash or promises of future 
payments. Sometimes these sales take the fom1 of auctions or investment tenders, in which 
case the winning buyers offer the best price or the best investment program and employment 
guarantees. f n other cases, the sales are direct and noncompetitive, and shares are so ld 
through the public offerings. The second strategy is the mass privatization where allocation 
of the assets to the population is vi rtually free and a big fraction of the economy's assets is 
sold to private hands. Because allocation of assets is free, mass privatization requires less 
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preparation and hence is also faster than ordinary privatization. The first approach to 
privatization has been used in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Western Europe, as well 
as in Asia, Latin America, and more recently in Hungary and Germany. It has been tried and 
abandoned in Poland. Mass privatization was conducted in different forms in Eastern 
European countries and other post-communist countri es such as Mongolia. In almost all 
countries some shares were granted for free to workers and managers of the enterprises, and 
mass privatization was combined with sales of some assets through cash auctions or 
investment tenders. In Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Lithuania and Russia vouchers were 
distributed to the whole population with the subsequent exchange of these vouchers for 
shares in state enterprises. Poland used a direct a llocation of shares to specially organized 
mutual funds, fo llowed by distribution of shares in these funds to the population. 
Russia has experienced particular difficu lties in the transition from a plarmed to a 
market-oriented economy. Its recent economic conditions have been unprecedented in 
modem world history because of a confluence of major events. First, there was an increase in 
macroeconomic imbalances and structural problems during the 1980s; second, there were 
changes in external economic relations, including the break up of the Counci l for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CEMA); third, there was the disintegration of the USSR; and finally, 
after the collapse of central planning, Russia initiated major economic reforms in its 
transition to a market economy. Each of these events would in itself, have had a powerful 
impact on the economy. Taken together, they led to a collapse in foreign trade, shortages of 
imported inputs that aggravated the decline in domestic output, and difficu lties in financing 
the balance of payments and servicing external debt (Benedicte Vibe Christensen, 1994). The 
economy of Russia continued to decline in this transition period that started with the break-
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up of the Soviet Union. Since the very beginning of the transition the Russian government 
started the design and implementation of reforms aimed at restructuring the Russian 
economy. 
It became the conventional wisdom that the socialist economies could only be 
improved by liberalizing prices, privatizing all enterprises, and letting the market weed out 
the inefficient ones. Moreover, that could be best done with a big-bang. 
The economic transition in Eastern Europe and FSU began with the Polish big-bang 
reform program in January 1990. It was generally believed that the transition would start 
with a recession, caused both by restricti ve macroeconomic policies and by the restructuring 
of the economy required by the shift to a market economy. 
Fisher, Sahay, and Vegh (1 996) draw on data from 26 transition economies to 
describe their record of economic growth - how long it takes and how far output fall s before 
growth resumes. They found that the minimum length of the transition recession is about two 
years; the key to rapid growth is investments and policies that promote it; fast stabilization , 
liberali zation, and privatization bring benefits earlier. Selowsy and Martin (1997) came to 
similar conclusions. Table 1 presents the data on recession and growth in several transition 
economies in 1990-1997. Differences in output behavior are due to differences in initial 
conditions of the countries and exogenous shocks. Shocks in the FSU countries are typically 
larger than those in other countries. Also, within the FSU, the shocks in the Bal tics, which 
moved rapidly to world energy prices, were particularly large and help explain those 
countries' large output declines. 
Russia ' s macropolicy problems are rather different from those of the Eastern Europe 
countries, and, hence, their stabilization models cannot be readily applied to the FSU. 
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Table 1. Recession and Growth in Transition Economies, 1990-97 
Countries Years of GDP decline 
Average annual rate of GDP growth 
90-93 94-97 90-97 
Poland 2 -3.1 6.3 1.6 
Slovenia 3 -3.9 4.0 0.0 
Czech Republic 3 -4.3 3.6 -0.4 
Slovakia 4 -6.8 6.3 -0.3 
Hungary 4 -4.8 2.5 -1.1 
Romania 4 -6.4 2.1 -2.2 
Albania 4 -8.8 4.9 -2.0 
Croatia 4 -9.9 3.0 -3.4 
Latvia 4 -13.8 2.2 -5.8 
Annenia 4 -2 1.4 5.4 -8.0 
Uzbekistan 5 -3. 1 -0.3 - 1.7 
Estonia 5 -9.7 4.1 -2.8 
Kyrgyzstan 5 -9.3 -2.4 -5.8 
Lithuania 5 -18.3 0.5 -8.9 
Georgia 5 -24.1 2.9 - 10.6 
Belarus 6 -5.4 -2.6 -4.0 
Bulgaria 6 -7.4 -3.6 -5.5 
Kazakhstan 6 -6.7 -6.0 -6.3 
Macedonia 6 -12.9 -0.8 -6.9 
Azerbaijan 6 -14.5 -5.7 - 10.1 
Russia 7 -10. 1 -5 .3 -7.7 
Turkmenistan 7 -4.5 - 12.5 -8.5 
Tajikistan 7 -12.2 -8.4 -10.3 
Moldova 7 -12.6 -10.2 -11.4 
Ukraine 8 -10.1 -12.1 -1 1.4 
.. 
Source: G W. Kolodko, ( 1998) "Ten Years of Postsoc1ahs1 Trans1t:1on: Lessons for Policy Refonns" 
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For Russia we have to consider the structure of the inherited capital stock and the lack 
of financial instruments, institutions, and markets. So the 'sink-or-swim ' test in Russia was 
risky. Not only did some plants fail to survive when prices were competitive, but the fai lure 
of one enterprise forced a cascade of fai lures up and down the vertical chain in plants. 
Freeing prices was not sufficient. Enterprises running a cash-flow surplus either have to place 
it abroad or run a risk to have the real value of their cash positions eaten up by inflation. The 
capital inflow financed government subsidies and not industrial investment, subsidized 
enterprises tended to be the least efficient ones, and the resulting rise in the real exchange 
rate caused difficulties for the more promising firms in competing with imports 
(Leijonhufvud, Ruhl, 1997). At the end of June 1992, the ruble (Russian currency) was set at 
125.26 to the U.S. dollar, by the end of October 1992, the exchange rate fell to 390 rubles to 
U.S. dollar. After ruble devaluation in August 1998 exchange rate was 6. 1-6.2 rubles to U.S. 
dollar, (The World Bank, 1998) by the end of April 1999, it became 25 rubles to U.S. dollar. 
The poor performance of the Russian economy and the recent collapse of the ruble suggest 
that the design of these reforms may have been far from perfect. 
Russia's reforms have started with price liberalization accompanied by budget control 
and tight monetary policy. Extended privatization reform did not start until late 1991 , when 
Anatoly B. Chubais was put in charge of the State Committee on the Management of State 
Property (GKI). Privatization is one of the most important and most difficult elements in the 
transformation process of the economjes in Eastern Europe and the fom1er USSR. Large 
industrial companjes account for a large proportion of output and employment in countries 
with transition economies. Many of them are overstaffed and need to restructure before they 
can become profitable. 
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Table 2. Industrial Enterprises in Russia, 1988 
Enterprises by number Number of Output (bin Rb) Employment 
of employees enterprises (thousands) 
fewer than I 00 7,5 11 8.327 386 
10 1-200 4,666 14.767 678 
201 -500 5,582 37.025 1,806 
50 1-1 ,000 3,308 48.454 2,338 
1,001-2,000 1,997 66.690 2,789 
more than 2,000 2,176 29 1.397 12,733 
Economy totals 25,240 466.660 20,730 
Source: Erydman, Rapaczynsk1 , Earle e t al. ( 1993) "Pnvallzation Process m Russia, Ukrame and the 
Baltic States" 
Table 2 presents data on industrial enterprises in Russia before the transition. 
Most economists agree that large companies shou ld be separated from ministries and 
set up as independent corporations, although it is very difficult to fi nd private investors to 
take them over. From the economic efficiency point of view there are fo ur condi tions fo r 
successful privatization which are usually mentioned in the literature. First, when firms 
become private, political control and subsidies should disappear. Second, assets should be 
allocated to the most efficient users. Third, efficient governance mechanisms must be set up 
to make sure that the new owners actuall y restructure the privatized firm . Finally, 
privati zation must be fast. Timing is very important in the case of Russia, where the 
transition from communism is accompanied by massive the ft: of state assets by managers. 
The above objectives would be pursued by a benevolent government. But in practice, 
a government is highly influenced by politica l fo rces and its own interests. In transition 
economies a successful privatization program is usually populist. Most governments shape 
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their programs so as to benefit (or appear to benefit) large segments of the population. In 
Russia the idea of getting the population excited and involved in the privatization process 
was as important as distributing the benefits broadly. 
Why did the Russian government choose mass privatization? Appropriately designed 
auctions are the most efficient way to privatize enterprises, the assets are allocated to the best 
users, and the government can maximize its revenue. But this method will work best only if 
the country has perfect capital markets, which Russia does not have. Most Russians do not 
have significant wealth, and the country needs to privatize over 25,000 firms. Low wealth 
implies only low prices for privatized assets, but they would still be distributed efficiently 
provided capital markets were functioning. This could not happen in Russia since the wealth 
distribution is extremely uneven. As a resu lt, if auctions were held, not only would prices be 
low, but there would be few buyers, who are not necessarily politically or economically 
attractive. In addition, political instability resulted in many Russians believing that the 
country can return to old command regime with nationalization of privatized enterprises. 
Russia has moved through four phases of privatization. Phase one of Russian 
privatization began on October 1, 1992, and involved the distribution of privatization 
vouchers to every citizen and the holding of voucher auctions. The distribution of vouchers 
that can be exchanged for shares of enterprises was a strong government commitment to 
privatization. A significant fraction of shares (80%) was distributed to the public through 
vouchers. The second phase of Russian privatization, initiated in July 1994, involved the sale 
of vouchers of Russian companies for cash and privatization of some oftbe largest Russian 
enterprises. On January 1994 75% of medium- and large-scale enterprises in Russia and 
approximately 80% of small shops and restaurants (under 200 employees) had been 
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privatized. The third phase, starting in the second half of 1995, was "equity-for-loans 
auctions." The concept behind this model was to raise long-term loans from major Russian 
banks in exchange for giving the bankers controlling stakes in the largest Russian enterprises 
as collateral, together with voting and management rights. Since late 1995, Russia has been 
selling shares (primarily to domestic investors) of approximately 136 enterprises considered 
to be the "crown jewels" of Russian industry and other enterprises. Since January 1996, the 
Russian Government has reported that at least 70% of Russian GDP is composed of goods 
and services accounted for by the private sector. Early 1997 Russian Government figures 
reported that the private sector accounts for 75% of manufacturing enterprises, 85% of 
manufacturing, and more than 80% of the Russian workforce. In 1997, President Yeltsin 
signed plans for privatization of Russia's natural monopolies, including power and gas 
enterprises as well as Russian railroads. Privatization of the natural monopolies continues to 
be a disputed issue. 
The most common criticism of mass privatization is that it does not set up efficient 
governance of privatized firms. If shares are sold to the population no large blockholders will 
emerge, and no one will monitor the managers and enforce efficiency. To promote the 
formation of large blocks through vouchers the Russian programs have encouraged the 
creation of new private mutual funds that accept investors' vouchers in exchange for the 
funds' shares. Also, the programs allowed managers to acquire a large part of the firm at a 
subsidized price. Management in Russia bought about 13% of the shares, which they 
obtained at subsidized prices from the government, or from workers, or bought in voucher 
auctions. Vouchers were denominated in currency and were freely tradable, hence, potential 
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large shareholders could accumulate large blocks of vouchers and acquire large block of 
shares. 
Combinations of the above privatization mechanisms were also utilized by the 
Russian government. Partial information on the ownership structure that emerged in Russia is 
presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Ownership Structure of Some Privatized Firms 
Company Firm Privati- Percent ownership 
type or name employ- zation -ment Variant c: Q,I 
!3 .,, 
Q,I I-
bD ~ C'S = I-C'S 0 
~ ~ 
Food 130 2 60 20 
Zil 103,000 1 5 35 
Radio 5,000 1 5 55 
Steel 342 2 35 29 
Metal 350 2 18 66 
Textile 1,200 n.a. 5 92 
Machine tools 3,500 2 18 33 
Tmcking 1,300 2 5 58 
.. 
Source: Boycko, Shle1fer, V1slmy, ( 1993) "Pnvat1zmg Russia" 
Notes: n.a. Not available 
.,, 
i.. 
Q,I .,, :2 i.. 
Q,I 0 
"'O ~ ·;;; 


























I. Gives workers 25% of nonvoting shares for free. Managers can purchase 5% of shares at nominal 
prices. After privatization workers and managers can acquire an additional 10%. 
2. Gives managers and workers 5 1 % of equity, all voting, at a nominal price of 1. 7 times the July 
1992 book value of assets. An additional 5% could be purchased. 
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We can see some pattern in the table. In companies where lower-level employees 
carry out relatively routine tasks, higher-level employees usually have significant ownership 
or contro l rights. 
The process of privatization is not completed yet, and there is a substantial portion of 
industri al enterprises awaiting privatization. In some cases, privatized enterprises have not 
outperfom1ed production and efficiency levels of pre-privatization period. There are even 
instances where privatized enterprises became inactive after a change in ownership (from 
state to private) . All these hardships are not necessarily attributable to the privatization per 
se, but most likely are consequences of the poor performance of the struggling economy. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many empirical studies show that privatization improves economic efficiency. 
Vinning and Boardman (1992) survey dozens of studies ofpubljc and private firms around 
the world, most of which show private firms to be more efficient. Studies conducted by the 
World Bank (1992), Megginson et al. (1994)) have shown that efficiency improves after 
privatization. Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (1999) summarize findings ofrecent empirical 
studies on privatization in transition countries (Table 4). 
2.1. Review of Ownership Structure Literature 
What type of governance structure should be established for the finns in transition 
period is also discussed in a number of theoretical studies. For exan1ple, Schmidt and 
Schnitzer (1993) develop a simple model to analyze the impact of different corporate 
governance structures on management incentives, the efficiency of restructuring, and the 
social costs of the adjustment process. The authors summarize the main goals of 
corporati zation and privatization in the transition period, distinguish two different schemes of 
privatization, and discuss the incentives that can be given to managers under different 
governance structures. The market approach states that the best way to reform is to privatize 
as rapidly as possible and to leave the rest with market forces, with as little government 
interference as possible. The government approach, in contrast, claims that, given the scope 
of the transformation and the risks involved, a strong lead by government is unavoidable. 
In their paper there are three types of managers. First, those who own and run the 
individual firms, and who carry out the restructuring. For them incentives will come mainly 
from the threat of bankruptcy and the career concerns. 
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TabJe 4. Recent Studies Findjng Positive Effects of Privatization in Transition Economies 
Study Year Country Main Findings 
Djankov and 1998 Slovak Privatization is associated with an improvement 
Pohl Republic in performance across many indicators such as 
labor shedding, spinning off social assets, new 
markets and products, productivity. 
Frydman, Gray, 1997 Czech Strong evidence that private ownership-except 
Hessel and Republic, worker ownership-dramatically improves 
Rapaczynski Hungary, corporate performance. Privatization associated 
Poland with employment increase. 
Pohl, Andeson, 1997 Bulgaria, Privatization had a large impact on 
Claessens and Czech restructuring. On average, a firm privatized for 
Djankov Republic, fou r years will increase productivity 3-5 times 
Hungary, more than a simjlar firm that is still in state 
Poland ownership. 
Earle and Estnn 1997 Russia Privatization results in higher labor productjvity 
and greater restructuring in a variety of areas. 
Earle, Estrin and 1996 Russia Privatization results in somewhat greater 
Leshechenko depoliticization and restructuring. 
Barberis, 1996 Russia The presence of new owners, which results 
Boycko, Shleifer from privatization, increases the likelihood of 
and Tsukanova restructuring. 
Pohl, Djan.kov 1996 Bulgaria, Progress on privatization corresponds closely to 
and Anderson Hungary, the extent of large firms' restructuring in terms 
Poland, of export performance, efficiency of labor and 
Slovakia material use, and profitability. 
Belka, Estrin, 1995 Poland Privatization is associated with greater 
Shleifer, Singh restructuring across a variety of areas. 
.. 
Source: Havrylrshyn and McGeltlgan (1999), "Pnva t1zat1on m T rans1t1on Countnes: A Samplmg of 
Literature" 
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The second type of managers is directors. They monitor and control the firms in the 
holding company's portfolio. Financial intermediaries compensate their directors using stock 
options and relative performance evaluations. The third type of managers is called 
administrators. If individual firms have not been privatized yet, they are owned by the state 
and controlled by the government which hires administrators, who will behave like 
bureaucrats and react to political pressure. 
To develop the model, Schmidt and Schnitzer use several working hypotheses. First, 
the transition period is characterized by rapidly changing market conditions, economic and 
political instability, and a high degree of uncertainty. Second, the limited use of stock options 
and perfom1ance-based compensation schemes play an insignificant role in motivating 
managers to restructure their firms efficiently while the threat of bankruptcy may have a 
substantial effect. Third, privatization is a commitment device of the government not to 
subsidize unsuccessful firms. Fourth, the incentive of the government to sell the companies 
after the transition period is not considered. 
Their model compares two different governance structures. There are n firms 
controlled either by a holding company or by a government agency. Each firm is run by a 
manager. For each firm there are two states of the world, success and failure. There are only 
two possible realizations of the net present value of the fum V; e {v ; ,V;} , with 
V ; < V; L < V ;, where V/ - liquidation value, V ; - expected net present value from staying in 
business, and V ; - expected net present value if firm fai Is. The probability of success, 
P;(a,.), is a function of the effort a; that manager i spends in reorganizing his company. 
Because the manager's effort a; is unobservable, his wage w; cannot be contingent on ai> 
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thus, the manager gets a fixed salary. The manager can be induced to work harder than 
a; = 0 in order to reduce the probability that the fim1 is liquidated. 
The time structure of the model is as follows. In period 0 the government decides on 
the privatization scheme. In period I the manager chooses bis level of effort, nature 
determines the success or failure of the manager (fi rm), and the state of the world is reali zed 
and observed by the owner of the firm. In period 2 the owner decides on liquidation of the 
firm and the payoff is realized. 
At date 2, social welfare associated with firn1 i is given by 
if X; = 1 
if X ; = 0' 
where 6; is the total social cost of liquidation of firm i and X ; denotes the decision whether 
to close down firm i (x; = o)or keep it in operation (x; =I). 6 ; is the aggregate of the 
utility loss incurred by workers ( 67') , the manager ( 67) and the rest of society ( 6~ ). 
The welfare-maximizing effort level of the managers satisfies 
a{
8 
E arg m.ax{p;(a;) · V; + (1 - P;(a;)) · max{v/ - 6 ;,_~J - a;} 
a1 eR0 
So, in case of the socially optimal allocation, the manager should increase bis level of 
effort Wltil the marginal social benefit equals his marginal cost. 
In case of private control, the firm will be shut down only if it is privately unprofitable. The 
manager does not take into account the social costs of liquidation borne by workers and the 




The manager expends too little effo rt compared wi th the first-best. 
ln case of government control, at date 2 the government decides which firm to close 
down subject to the subsidy constraint. The government agency can take the positive NPV of 
the profitable firms to cross-subsidize the losses of some companies. 
L; = the set o f outcomes which lead to a liquidation of firm i 
q; (a_,.)= Pr(l; Ja _; ) = the probabil ity that firm i wi ll be shut down if it fa il s. 
The manager's problem is to pick a; such that 
a; E arg max{ w - ( I - P; (a; ))-q; (a _;)- 67 - a ;} 
a,eR~ 
If it is certain that the government will not have the funds to subsidize the firm, there 
is no difference between private and government control. But when the manager foresees that 
ifhe fails the government will subsidize his firm, he spends less effort compared with the 
private ho lding case. So, under both regimes lhe manager of an ind iv idual firm is likely to 
spend an ineffi ciently low amount of effort, but he will work harder i f hi s company is 
privately contro lled than if it is under the government control. 
The model has several drawbacks. The authors pointed out that in the case of 
government control, the budget of the government may be insufficient to subsidize a ll firms 
that failed, so too many firms might be closed down. But this possibility is not formally 
presented in the manager' s decis ion problem. In the model managers make their investment 
decis ion knowing that in case of failure the government will subsidi ze the firm, and they do 
not take into consideration the possibility of insufficient funds for subsidy. There is also a 
question about government commitment. One of the assumptions of the model is that the 
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government will not subsidize unsuccessful privatized firms. The authors argue that there 
will be only few cases when the government would subsidize a private firm because of 
concern about the social cost of liquidation. But many Eastern European and FSU countries 
have tax exemption for two or more years for newly privatized firm, which can be considered 
as a subsidy. Even though these subsidies are not specifically contingent on failure, priority is 
given to the unsuccessful firms. Also, the industries in these countries consist of very large 
vertically integrated enterprises, and it is very difficult for one enterprise to be profitable 
(even after restructuring) if others are not. So, to avoid shutting down a substantial part of the 
industry, the government may want to subsidize the firms even though they are in private 
hands. Another reason for giving a subsidy to private firms is the political pressure. ln the 
model only administrators are sensitive to political pressure. In the real world, in transition 
economies the government's decision on liquidation of the private firm is still highly 
influenced by lobbing efforts. Interest groups successfully lobby government to control 
private or regulated firms to their benefit. All these reasons make as ctisagree with authors' 
confidence in government commitment. 
Some of the literature on different ownership structures does not give a satisfactory 
answer to the source of economic efficiency improvements after privatization. More than 
that, this literature supplies us with an "irrelevance proposition" (Sappington and Stiglitz 
( 1987), Shapiro and Willig ( 1990), and Schleifer and Vishny (1994 )), which asserts that 
whatever economic outcome can be achieved with state-owned enterprise it can also be 
achieved through privatization, and vice versa. This proposition rests on two implicit 
assumptions. First, the country has to have a benevolent government, and there have to be 
unlimited side payments between the government official controlling the enterprise and its 
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managers. If this condition does not hold then the privatization is very likely to result in 
improved economic performance. This point is illustrated by Boyko, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1996). The authors argue that state owned enterprises can be highly inefficient due to the 
fact that they pursue objectives of the politicians that control them. In particular, they 
consider a situation when politicians try to maintain high employment levels to win future 
votes in re-elections. They develop a model with a firm that only chooses its level of 
spending on labor E . It can spend an efficient amount L or a higher amount H > L . The 
higher spending comes from excess wages and employment, and it is the source of political 
benefits, such as voting support from the employees and labor unions. There are two players 
in this model, shareholders and politician, who have preferences over E. The manager 
represents private shareholders, the politician represents the public. The manager owns a 
fraction a of the firm's profits, the Treasury owns a fraction (1- a), the politician owns no 
equity. ln a public firm, a is close to zero, in private firm a is close to 1. The objective 
function of the politician (in dollars) is given by: 
Up = qE - n~I -a)E 
The marginal benefi t to a politician of an extra dollar labor spending is q < 1. But this 
spending reduces the value of the Treasury's share of firm's profits. The cost to the politician 
of dollar of profits forgone by the Treasury is m < 1, and he does not care directly about the 
profits forgone by the manager. The objective function of the manager (shareholders) is 
Um = -aE . When the politician controls E , he maximizes profit by choosing E = H. In this 
case political benefits per dollar of extra spending on labor exceeds costs per dollar of profit 
forgone by the Treasury. So political control leads to inefficiencies that benefit politicians at 
the expense of the Treasury and other shareholders. When manager controls labor spending, 
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he chooses E = L . A subsidy from the Treasury to the firm is denoted by t. The effective 
subsidy is a.t . The cost to the politician of making a subsidy is ka.t , k < l . The objective 
function of the politician is Up= - m(l -a.) + qE-ka.t, and the objective function of the 
manager is Um = -a.E + a.t . Without a subsidy the manager chooses L , he and the politician 
then bargain and he chooses H if he is better off with H and transfers than he is with L. 
Privatization can raise the cost to politicians of influencing enterprises (since subsidies to 
private firms necessary to force them to remain inefficient are politically harder to sustain 
than wasted profits of state firms) , and hence can lead to efficient restructuring of firms. 
The second requirement for the "irrelevance proposition" to hold is the feasibi lity of 
writing complete contingent contracts which govern the entire lifespan of the firm at the 
stage of privatization. If the firm remains regulated after privatization, then the private owner 
will refrain from making relationship specific investments because he foresees that the 
government will exploit the fact that investment costs are sunk in order to expropriate quasi-
rents. Thus, if complete contingent contracts can be written, then any organizational mode 
can be mimicked by any other organizational mode through a complete contract. 
2.2. Review of Incomplete Contract Literature 
The starting point of the incomplete contract literature is the assumption that 
complete contingent long-term contracts cannot be written. Suppose that the future surplus 
which can be generated by the involved parties depends among other things on the amounts 
of some non-contractible, relationship-specific investments. The division of the quasi-rents 
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from these investments cannot be controlled through a contract ex ante1 but will be 
determined only by the ex post bargaining power of the involved parties. However, the 
allocation of bargaining power can be affected by the choice of an appropriate governance 
structure. Hence, the governance structure matters because it affects the investment 
incentives of the involved parties. 
A number of studies (for example, Laffont and Tiro le (199 1) and Schmidt (1996)) 
tried to adapt the incomplete contTact approach to the privatization context. Klaus M. 
Schmidt (1996) states that if privatization makes a difference it must be due to the fact that 
only incomplete contracts are feasible at the stage of privatization. Costs and benefits of 
privatization to an owner-manager are considered in a simple model with a monopolistic firm 
that produces a public good. In case of privatization, the new owner is also the manager of 
the firm. He pays a privatization price z chosen by the government. If the fim1 remains 
nationalized the government pays a fixed wage w to the firm's manager. The manager's role 
is to make a personal non-monetary investment (effort) e ~ 0 to reduce future production 
cost c(y,e), where y is the output of the firm. The parameter e E {~,e} is private 
information of the owner of the firm. The manager's effort affects the probability distribution 
over B. Higher managerial effort yields lower cost of production. The social benefit of y is 
b(y). Effort is unobservable and non-contractible. The economic relationship in the model 
lasts for three periods. In period 0, the government decides whether to privatize the firm or to 
keep it nationalized. In period 1, the manager makes his or her investment decision and the 
state of the world is realized and observed by the owner of the firm. In period 2, the 
1 Quasi-rents are non-verifiable and/or non-observable. 
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government may offer the subsidy scheme (s) to the firm ; subsequently, the payoffs are 
realized. The government's payoff is given by 





Schmidt argues that in the case of a nationalized firm, the manager has no incentives 
to invest in cost reduction because the government cannot commit to reward him for good 
performance or to punish him for high costs since the manager's wage is fixed. In the case of 
a privatized firm, the government max imizes its objective function, given the manager's 
private information by solving a standard mechanism design problem. The solution of this 
model is that under privatization the manager spends too little effort as compared to the first 
best, but works harder as compared to nationalization. The main result is summarized in a 
theorem: Privatization to an owner-manager is preferred by the government to nationalization 
if and only if the welfare gain through the more efficient effort decision of the owner-
manager outweighs the welfare loss due to the ex post inefficient low production level under 
privati zation. 
These findings are consistent with the results ofLaffont and Tirole (1991). The 
difference is in the formalization of costs and benefits of public ownership. Schmidt states 
that the public firm's benefit is that the government is better able to extract the firm's 
informational rent, and the cost is the government's noncredible commitment to future choice 
of policy instruments. The cost of a private regulated firm in Laffont and Tiro le is the 
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conflict of interest between shareholders and regulators: "each principal fails to internalize 
the effect of contracting on the other principal and provides socially too few incentives to the 
firm 's insiders". They model thi s as a multi-principal mechanjsm design problem of special 
type. A government wants to realize an invisib le project with social value S. A single firm 
can reali ze this project at cost C = f3 - e, where f3 E ~, /3 ] is the manager's private 
information, and e is the managerial effort. The manager can commit non.monetary and 
noncontractible investment, 7 E {O,J}. Not investing ( T = 0) yields no benefit. Investment 
(7 = I) can be used internally (private nonmonetary benefit D > I goes to the firm insiders) 
and externally (private benefit D' > D goes to outsiders). The benefit is not contractible and 
cannot be sold. When the government owns the fim1, it gives the manager an incentive 
scheme based on the realization of the cost, L(C). Since the governrnent cannot expropriate 
the managers' investment, managers do not invest. The objective function of a utilitarian 
government is: W = S - (1+ 2 )(t + C) +BP+ U, where U = t - lfl(e) is the manager's utility, 
BP .is the social value of the cost reduction, and 2 is the shadow cost of public funds. In the 
case of a regulated private firn1, in period 1 the government sells the firm to the public at 
price p, and in period 2 regulates the firm. The shareholders offer an incentive scheme to the 
managers and provide them with a reward w. The shareholders are taxed at the rater. The 
higher taxes reduce incentives to collect information that benefits the firm. The government 
observes C but cannot observe w, makes a transfer to the firm z(C). The managers produce 
only if they accept both offers. The government objective function is: 
W = S -(1+2)(z + C--r(z -w)) + BR(r) + U + (1--r)(z- w) + 2, where 
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U = w-tf(e) + (D-1), and BR is the social value of cost reductions. The advantage of 
private ownership is to make credible the commitment of nonexpropriation of managerial 
incentives. 
The authors consider the special case when decision variables (production cost C) are 
perfect complements. There are cases when decision variables can be substitutes. For 
example, Martimort (1996) developed a model where an agent contracts separately with two 
principals. A contract between principal and agent specifies a transfer to the agent and the 
level of trade. The agent's utility function depends on the total transfer, the trades, and the 
agent's type. Martimort allow for both contract complements and contract substitutes. In this 
case, the results of the analysis can be altered to give more support to privatization. 
As many other papers in this literature Laffont and Tirole deal with privatization of 
firms that remain regulated. Their model, while being applicable to certain firms in capitalist 
economies (as the authors point out in their paper), cannot be readily employed to analyze 
privatization in transition economies. We think that the main reason is that incentive schemes 
are rarely observed in transition economies as compared to capitalist economies. 
Summarizing the literature review, it firmly favors private to public ownership. 
Although one question remains unanswered as to what type of ownership structure is most 
preferred for privatized enterprises. Is it the most efficient to transfer an enterprise into single 
hands or should a joint ownership be established? In this thesis we try to partially answer this 
question using a highly stylized model of a vertical chain (upstream and downstream) of 
enterprises trading in an intermediate output. Our model largely builds on the classical 
treatment ofresidual rights approach to ownership by Hart (1995). In the rest of this chapter 
we overview his basic model. 
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2.3. Overview of the Hart Model 
Hart looks at a highly stylized situation in which there are two firms with assets a 1 
and ai, and two managers operating them, M 1 and M 2• Mi in combination with ai supplies a 
single unit of input to M 1• M 1 in combination with a1 uses this product to produce output that 
is so ld on the market. The parties are risk-neutral and have unlimited amounts of wealth. 
Whoever owns asset a1 or a2 has all control rights over the asset. There are three possible 
ownership structures. First is non-integration: M 1 owns a1 and Mi owns a 2; second is type 1 
integration: M 1 owns a1 and a2; third is type 2 integration: M i owns a 1 and ai. An economic 
relationship lasts for two periods. At date 0 managers make relationship-specific investments 
that make their assets more productive. The investments of the managers affect their payoffs 
both if they trade and if they do not. There is no uncertainty about costs or benefits, but there 
is uncertainty about the type of input needed for M1. This uncertainty is resolved at date 1 
when the input is supplied and it becomes clear what the relevant type of input is. This ex 
ante uncertainty about the input makes it impossible to write effective long-term contract. 
M1 'sex post payoff in case of trade is R(i) - p, whereR(i) is revenue, i is 
investment, and p is the agreed input price. If trade does not occur, M1 buys "non-specific" 
input from an outside supplier at price p or, if he has access to a2, he hires someone to make 
the input for him. His ex post payoff in this case is r(i; A) - p, where r(i; A) < R(i) and A is 
the set of assets M 1 owns. Similarly, M2 'sex post payoff in case of trade is p - c\e), where 
C(e) is production cost, and e is investment; if trade does not occur, M i will sell the product 
on the competitive spot market, the payoff is p-c(e;B) , where c(e;B) > c\e) and Bis the 
set of assets M 2 owns. 
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There are always ex post gains from trade and the total surplus is given by 
R(i) -c(e) > r{i;A)-c{e; B) ~ 0 for all i and e, and A, B. It is supposed that R, r, C, c, and i, 
e are observable to both parties, but are not verifiable and cannot be part of an enforceable 
contract. Parties have symmetric information and reali ze the gains from trade through 
negotiation. Hart does not want to get into the details of contract negotiation and simply 
assumes that ex post gains from trade are divided 50:50 and input price is given by 
1 1 l 1 1 l l 1 
p = p--C- -c+-R--r and payoffs are n 1 = -p +- R +-r- - C+-c for M, and 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
- 1 l 1 1 
7! =p+-R --r+-C--c forM2. 2 2 2 2 2 
The solution of the model is: 
The author assumes that R'(i) > r'(i; A) and IC(e ~ > jc'(e; Bl The main finding is that 
under any ownership structure there is underinvestment in relationship-specific investments. 
The analysis of the optimal ownership structure is summarized in Table 5. 
Summarizing, the benefit of integration is that ' the acquiring firm 's incentive to make 
relationship-specific investments increases since, given that it has more residual control 
rights, it will receive a greater fraction of ex post surplus created by such investments. ' On 
the other hand, the cost of integration is that the acquired firm's incentive to make 
relationship-specific investments decreases since, given that it has fewer residual control 
rights, it will receive a smaller fraction of the incremental ex post surplus created by its own 
investments. 
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Table 5. The results of Hart model 
Assets and investments Definition Optimal ownership 
structure 
a1 and a2 are independent r'(i;a1.a2 )= r'(i;a,) 
c'(e; a,, a2 ) = c'(e; a 2 ) 
non-integration 
a 1 and a2 are strictly r'(i;a,.)= r'(i;0) or some form of 
complimentary 
c'(e;ai) = c'(e;0) integration 
Mi's investment decision solution to mine aC(e) + e is 
is inelastic independent of a in the type 1 integration 
1 
range- 5 a 5 1 
2 
M/s investment decision Solution to max; pR(i)- i IS 
is inelastic 
independent of pin the range_!_ 5 p 5 1 
type 2 integration 
2 
Mi's investment C(e) is replaced by BC(e) + (1-B)e 
becomes relatively and c(e;B) is replaced by type 1 integration 
unproductive 
B c( e; B) + (1 - B)e 
M/s investment becomes R(i) is replaced by 9R(i) + (1- 9)i ana 
relatively unproductive 
r(i; A) is replaced by B r(i; A)+ (1-B)i 
type 2 integration 
M/s human capital is c'(e;a1,a2 ) = c'(e;0) 
essential type 1 integration 
Mi's human capital is r'(i;a"a2 ) = r'(i;0) 
essential type 2 integration 
M/s and Mi's human c'(e; a"a2 ) = c'(e;0) and 
all ownership structures 
capital are essential 
r'(i;a"ai) = r '(i;0) are equally good 
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Non-integration is optimal when assets are independent, complimentary assets should 
be owned together and joint ownership is suboptimal. 
In the next chapter we present my model that uses an analysis similar to the one 
described above. The major difference is that we allow relationship-specific investment of 
one of the tracling partner to benefit another partner. This results in a joint ownership being 
optimal for certain specifications of the model. We use incomplete contract approach to the 
choice of ownership structure after privatization, and consider transition economy of Russia 
with vertically integrated industry producing private goods. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE CHOICE OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
The focus of the model is on the structure of Russia's manufacturing sector which in 
the past was composed of a number of vertically integrated industries each one under its own 
ministry. To understand the problems inherent in such an industrial stmcture, one can think 
of the plants under one of the old Moscow ministries as analogous to a workstation on an 
assembly line. Like a workstation receiving its intermediate good input from the preceding 
station and delivering its output to the succeeding one, such an enterprise is basically without 
alternati ve suppliers for many of its inputs and largely without alternative customers for its 
outputs. The line is only as strong as its weakest link. lf one station on the line breaks down 
or fails to deliver, the failure cascades up and down the whole line and brings it to a halt. lf 
control and decision-making were to be decentralized, the result is an unstab le chain of 
bilateral monopolies with the corresponding hold up problems in the absence of alternative 
suppl iers and buyers (Leyonhufvud A. and Ruhl C. , 1997). Currently, many enterprises 
cannot function due to frequent defaults of their buyers and/or suppliers. 
In the analysis we ignore government revenue generated during privati zation, and 
focus on ex post efficiency of vertically integrated enterprises under different ownership 
structures, given that complete contingent contracts cannot be written. If asset and capital 
markets are perfect, the initial ownership structure will not have any influence on the ex post 
efficiency even if complete contracts caimot be written. ln this case, firms wi th highly 
complementary assets will establish jo int ventures by acqu iring each other's shares, and thi s 
merger wi ll be value enhancing. In case firn1s stay independent the initial allocation wi ll 
remain intact. That is, the initial allocation of ownership rights is irrelevant for the ex post 
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productive efficiency given that owners have access to unlimited money resources and 
ownership can change hands. But these assumptions are very optimistic for the Russian 
economy, which is characterized by asset market failures and capital market imperfections. 
Hence, the initial allocation of property rights can have a substantial effect on future 
economic performance of enterprises. Thus, in the model we make five assumptions: 
complete contracts cannot be written, 
asset and capital markets are imperfect, 
the firms' assets (the managers' investments) are complimentary, 
the payoffs of the firms are interdependent on the levels of managers ' 
investments, 
there is no asymmetry of information between the managers. 
Unforeseen contingencies, unverifiable tenns, costs of enforcement, and a lack of 
common language all contribute to contracts being incomplete. These characteristics of 
contracts provide incentives to acquire ownership, since ownership is a source of power 
when contracts are in dispute and is a way of securing residual property rights. The 
ownership may change hands if managers sign the contract on creating, for example, a joint 
venture. In this case both managers should have the incentives to invest more since they 
share final surplus. 
Classical models on incomplete contracting and ownership rights assume that 
relationship-specific investments of the manager make his own assets more productive. We 
assume that relationship-specific investments of the manager producing intermediate output 
will affect not only that manager's cost but also the cost and value of the final product, 
produced by the other manager. So the level of the intem1ediate producer's investments 
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affects his own payoff and the payoff of the final good producer regardless of their 
participation in the production process. 
It is proven that complimentary assets should be owned together, i.e. one manager 
owns assets of both firms. In his model Hart stated that if the investments are embodied in 
the human capital, the same person should own the strictly complimentary assets (or assets 
should not be jointly owned). When investments are embodied in physical assets rather than 
human assets, it is no longer clear. In our model we look at the joint ownership structure 
where both managers have a share of the enterprise. We assume that firms' assets are 
complimentary and the relationship-specific investments may be investments in physical 
capital. Investments in physical capital means that even if one of the managers does not 
participate in production his investments affect the payoff of the other manager, given that 
this manager controls assets of both firms. The question we want to answer is whether the 
joint ownership is optimal under given assumptions; and if yes, what type of the joint 
ownershjp structure will lead to the optimal outcome. In the models discussed above 
managers have the option of buying (selling) their output from (to) an outside supplier at the 
market price. In our model the outside option for both managers is nonparticipation in 
production. Whether the manager produces or not he gets his share of the joint venture's 
pro.fit. To ensure the outside option we introduce new non-transferable costs for both 
managers. These costs are incurred only during the production. One manager has to exert 
additional effort to supply the intermediate output; another manager has to put some effort to 
prepare the intermediate output for the final stage of production. As opposed to Hart's model, 
some choices of the relationship-specific investments can lead to nonparticipation solution. 
The level of the manager's relationship-specific investment will determine the type of the 
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intermediate output (its quality, value to the firm, etc.). This type will affect the non-
transferable cost the other manager must bear to produce the final output with desired 
characteristics and the value of the fina l product. The better the intermediate output 
accommodates the final good producer's needs the lower his non-transferable costs and the 
higher the value of the final output. Hence, the final product's value and additional cost for 
the producer of the final good depends on both his own relationship-specific investments and 
the relationship-specific investments of the intermediate good supplier. Given these 
assumptions, joint ownership may be optimal. 
The model is highly stylized. There are two private firms, upstream and downstream, 
owned by different managers. We denote the two firms (managers) by Mu and M", where 
Mu is upstrean1 firm (manager) and M" is downstream. The relationship between firms is 
vertical. The manager of the upstream firm, combined with the assets of this division, 
produces and supplies an intermediate output to the downstream firm. The manager of the 
downstream firm, combined with the assets of that division, then uses that intem1ediate 
output to produce output that is sold on the market. Each manager has a comparative 
advantage in running his own firm. The model has three stages (Figure 1). In the first stage, 
managers contract on the ownership structure of the enterprise. This contract will allocate 
ownership rights or residual rights of control and determine a transfer payment between the 
managers. We assume that managers can create a joint venture and have the fo llowing 
options. The manager of the downstream firm can acquire controlling stock of the venture; 
the manager of the upstream firm can acquire controlling stock. Managers choose a,(1-a) -





































































































































































































































































Some side payments may occur during acquisition. Ex ante relationship-specific 
investments (I", Id) are made by both managers in the second stage. These investments are 
observable to both parties, but since /
11 
and I d stand for managerial effort decision they are 
non-verifiable to the third party and, hence, non-contractible, they are considered to be sunk 
costs. Investment decisions are made independently and non-cooperatively. Although parties 
cannot write a comprehensive contract they can make correct calculations about the expected 
return from any level of investment they make. I" is the level of effort the manager of the 
upstream firm exerts to reduce costs and increase the value of the intermediate good. CfJu (!" ) 
is M,, 's cost of the effort level ( acp" (!,,) > 0, 
82 
<p,, (I J > 0) . I is the level of effort the a1 a1 2 d 
" u 
manager of the downstream firm exerts to increase the value of intermediate output. cpAid) 
output value both if upstrean1 manager produces and if he does not. The level of the 
relationship-specific investments depends on the ownershjp structure. In the third stage, the 
owner of the controlling stock sets the amount of payment, p, to the other manager for his 
service and product. The owner of noncontrolling stock has an option not to participate in 
production and just take his share of joint venture' s profit. Due to the partial ownership 
nature, the payment is set such that the owner maximizes his own payoff subject to the other 
manager' s reservation utility. Reservation utility is the manager's payoff in case of 
nonparticipation. The owner of noncontrolling stock gets the same payoff whether he 
participates or not. The controlling stock' s owner offers the payment only when he is 
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interested in the other manager's participation. So in the last stage only the owner of 
controlling stock makes the decision. If the manager does not participate in production, the 
owner of controlling stock has to hire a new manager. If parties agree to collaborate they sign 
a contract, which specifies p since only payment is contractible in this model. 
There are four possible scenarios of the final outcome: 
Md owns controlling stock, a E (0.5, l], and Mu does not participate; 





owns contro11ing stock, (1- a) E (0.5, I], and Md does not participate; 
M
11 
owns controlling stock, (1-a) E (0.5,l], and Md participate. 
If the upstream manager participates in production, his cost of producing intermediate 
output is C(l,,), ( ie(l,,) < 0, 
02C~,,) > 0 ). In addition, he has to make an additional non-
O!u OJU 
transferable investment Fu (1,,) (8F11 (l,,) < 0, 
82 




does not participate in the production process, the cost of intermediate output is c(I,,) , 
a:(1,,) a2c(I ) 
(-- < 0, 
2
11 > 0). The value of final output for the downstream firm if both 
of,, c3Iu 
managers participate in production is v(1d,1,,), 
either of the managers does not produce, the value of output is v(ld,1,,), 
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assume that for all /
11 
and Id v(Id,!J ~ v(Id,!J and c(IJ ~ C(!J because the relationship-
specific investments pay off more when both managers participate in production. If the 
downstream manager participates in production, he has to make an additional non-
. ( ) aFd (I ,Id ) 82 Fd (I ,Id) ()2 Fd (I ,/ J 0) 
transferable mvestment F I I ( " < 0 " > 0 " < to 
d "· d a1 ' a1 2 ' a1 a1 
d u II d 
produce the final good. It may be considered as a cost for the downstream manager of 
adjusting the intermediate output for production of the final good. The magnitude of this cost 
depends on the relationship-specific investment of both managers. F,, (/11 ) and Fd (!11 / d) may 
be considered as managers ' costs of participation in production. 
The total cost of production (including effort cost) when both managers participate is 
If only the downstream manager participates in production the total cost is 
c( I,, ) + Fd (I 11 , Id ) + rp,, ( 111 ) + rp d (Id ) . 
If only the upstream manager participates, the total production cost is 
c(JJ + F,,(J,,) + rp,,(111 ) + rpd(Jd). The final product value in the last two cases is v(Id,IJ . 
Participation decision depends on the level of 1
11 
and Id . Since both managers have a 
comparative advantage in rwming their firms, at the optimum, the owner of the controlling 
stock wants the other manager to participate in production and offers him a payment for the 
service. After contract on pis signed the intennediate output is supplied and state of the 
world is realized. 
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3.1. The First-Best Choice of Investments 
If the relationship-specific investments were verifiable the parties could write a 
contract which would specify the investment level. 
Managers would coordinate their actions and choose investments that maximize total 
ex ante payoff: 
(1) 
The reason is that if parties choose / uand Id that do not maximize ( 1), each party can 
always be better off by choosing I" and Id that will maximize (1) and redistributing increased 
surplus through side payments. 
Tl fi 
. FB FB 
1e trst-best mvestrnent levels, 1
11 
,Id , have to be chosen such that 
av(Iu,Id) aFd (Iu,Jd) 
= acpd (l") 
aid old a1" 
av(I11 ,Id) oc(I") aFA111 ,1d) aF,, (Ju) - acpu (IJ 
aJU aJ11 a1u a1u a1u 
The solution gives the investment functions for the downstream manager, Id FB (Ju), 
and for the upstream manager, f 11 FB (I n) . The first-best outcome is illustrated in Figure 2. 
The investment functions for the both managers are positively s loped. 
+ 
02v(I11 ,1") a1FA1u,IJ 
D = _ a1daI11 a1daI11 O 
a2v(I11 ,1J _ a1FAI,,Jd) a1cpA1d) > ' 
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Figure 2. The first-best investment levels. 
+ 
a2v (lu,1t1 ) a2FAI11 1J 
U= 8/ UB/tl BI UB! tl 
a2c(1J a2FA1u,1t1 ) _ a2F,,(111 ) 2 > 0' a rp,, (!J 
a1,, 2 a1,, 2 
+ + + + 
where D and U are the slopes of the downstream and upstream managers' functions 
respectively. The OC ensure that M ,1 's investment function is steeper thanMu 's investment 
function , slope I /
11 (1
11
) > slope /
11 
f"B (/ ,1). The intersection of the functions gives the optimal 
level of effort for each manager. 
The ex ante payoff for upstream firm would be 
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and the ex ante payoff for downstream finn would be 
M d = a[(V(!u ,!J- C(I,,)]- FAiu ,rd)- rpd (Id)+ rd (Id) ' 
where -r u (I J and -rd (Id) are the side payments to the upstream and the downstream 
. a-r u ) a1r (I ) a-r (I ) a1 i- u ) 
manao-ers respechvely ( u u > 0 11 11 > 0 and t1 t1 > O t1 t1 > 0). 
0 
' a1 ' 2 ' a1 ' ? u (}Ju d ol d 
!
11 
FB ,f,/8 have to satisfy FOC for individual payoffs maximization in the first-best 
world: 
a av(I,, ,1J _ aFAI 11 ,!J _ arpd (Id)+ a-rd (Id) = 0 ; 
of d a1d a1d a1d 
(l - a)( aV(I11 ,IJ _ oC(J,,))- 0Fd(I11 ,!J _ 0F11 (JJ _ orp11 (IJ + a-r,, (I,,) = O. 
of,, aJU (}/ II arU of,, aJll 
· · FD FB O'f I(/ d) OT (I ) 




) +-rd (Id ) = 0 , and ' , 11 11 should 
ai d ol u 
satisfy FOC for the .first-best. So, under any ownership structure we can find side payments 
that will ensure the first-best outcome. 
If / 11 and Id are ex ante contractib le, "the first-best can be achieved under any 
ownership structure, and so degree of integration of the firms is irrelevant"(S. Grossman and 
0. Hart, 1986). Since th.e first-best outcome is not supportable with non-contractible 
investments initial allocation of ownership rights influences the ex post efficiency. We can 
use the first-best only for comparison. 
In the next sections we consider the second-best world where the parties choose their 
investment levels non-cooperatively. 
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3.2. The Choice of the Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure (a ) wi 11 affect ex ante investment decisions through the 
influence on the ex post payoffs. Each a will lead to different levels of the relationship-
specific investments. 
The model is solved backwards. 
Stage three. Given / 11 and Id , the owner decides whether he needs the manager's 
participation or not. If participation is chosen, the participation constraint must be satisfied. 
Unlike Hart, we assume that some stage two decisions may result in non-participation. 
Stage two. / 11 and Id will be chosen simultaneously and non-cooperatively by both 
managers to maximize M u and M d subject to participation constraint. The nonowner knows 
that regardless of the ex post decision, he will receive his reservation utility - payoff in case 
he does not participate. Owner takes the manager's effort as given and chooses his own effort 





maximizes M d. The owner's payoff function and whether the participation takes place ex 
post depends on his choice of the effort level. Thus, the owner's payoff may not be 
everywhere concave. That gives the possibility of multiple Nash equilibrium for a given a. 
When optimal (equilibrium value of)I
11 
(a) and Id (a) are found, the next step is to maximize 
total payoffs with respect to a, given /
11 
(a) and Id (a). Each subgame has a Nash 
equilibrium [!11 (a),Id (a) ] that satisfies participation constraint and gives maximum total 
payoff for given a . 
Stage one. Given the solutions, the highest total payoff will be 
chosen,argmax [w P(a),W NP(a)] , where WP(a) and W NP (a) are total payoffs for 
a 
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participation and non-participation cases respectively. We look for a that maximizes total 
payoff because the parties can di stribute increased surplus through side payments. The 
ownership structure that yields the highest value of the total payoff is optimal and will be 
chosen in equilibrium. 
We now consider possible scenarios of the game separately. 
3.3. The Manager of the Downstream Firm Owns Controlling Stock of the Joint 
Venture 
In stage one the downstream manager acquires controlling stock of the joint venture. 
in stage two both managers make relationship-specific investments. In the third stage only 
the downstream manager makes the decision. Given the levels of 1
11 
and Id , he decides 
whether he needs Mu ' s participation or not. If the downstream owner wants Mu to 
participate he makes an offer, p, to the upstrean1 manager. F inally both firms claim their 
shares of the joint venture's profit. 
Md ' s decision depends on the participation constraint, Gd. The participation 
constraint is the locus that separates two domains (the domain where participation is optimal 
and the domain where non-participation .is optimal) and is the difference between gains from 
Mu's participation and cost of his participation. 
'" 
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The solution for the case when Md is the owner may be found in two different 




We assume that marginal return from investments is greater when Mu produces the 
. d th h d ac(/,,) ac(J,,) intermediate goo an e oes not, > , ___ , 
al l/ a1u 
II 
Figure 3. Domain I - M,, does not participate, Domain 11 - M
11 
pruticipates. 
2 The payment function is flatter than participation constraint <ls!opeGdl > lslopePI) and is a lways 
positioned above (Pl Gd > 0 ). It gives the third domain where P<O and G.;>O. To ensure that P is always 
positive, new equations should be introduced into the model. 
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The downstream manager induces the upstream manager to participate when Gd > 0 . 
Md is indifferent between keeping Mu and letting him go when Gd = 0, and Md does not 
want M
11 
to participate when Gd < 0 . The downstream manager does not want the upstream 
to participate when the gains from Mu's participation do not cover the M
11 
's cost of 
participation, [v(Jd,IJ- c(IJ] - [v(ld,IJ- c(i,,)] < F,, (1,,). Gd depends on a only indirectly, 
through the relationship-specific investments. 
If I 
11 
and Id are chosen such that Gd < 0, the downstream manager does not want the 
upstream to participate or believes that the upstream manager is always going to reject his 




The ex ante non-participation payoffs are: 
(2) 
(3) 
The first-order conditions are: 
av(! ,I ) BF (1 ,I ) Bq; (I ) 
a u d - d " d = r1 d for the downstream manager 
aJd Bi d Bi d ' 
(4) 
av(I ,I ) ac(I ) aq; (1 ) 
(1 - a)( " d - " ) = " " for the upstream manager. 
a1u a1., a1u 
(5) 







more value when the upstream manager is involved in production. Also Md hires a new 
manager for the upstream firm and the cost of intermediate good production is now c(I., ). 
Since M ., has comparative advantage in producing intermediate output and downstream firm 
42 
bears additional costs of hiring new manager, paying manager's salary, etc, c(/11 ) ~ C(Iu) . 
The upstream manager does not get any payment for his service and does not incur the 
additional cost F,, (1
11
) related to production process. He gets his share of the total payoff in 
the third stage. 
If !
11 
and I d are chosen such that Gd > 0, the downstream manager induces Mu to 
participate by offering M 
11 
the payment for his product and service (Figure 1, node II) . The 
ex ante participation payoffs are: 
M11 = (1-aXV(Id, J,,)-C(I,,)]-Fu(IJ - qJ11 (IJ+ p , 
M / = a[V(ld ,1,,)- C(I,,)] - FAI d ,!,,)- qJd (Id)- P · 
M ,, and Md write contract onp, where 
p = (1 - a X<v(I11 ,ld )- c(i,,)) - (V(/11 ,IJ-C(I,,))]+ F,, (1,,) . This payment is set so that 
M u always gets his reservation utility, i.e. M,, ' s payoff function is the same in case of 
participation and nonparticipation. So, 
M d = v(1 d ,!,,)-c(1,,)-(1- a Xv(I d ,I,,)- c(I,,)]- FA!d ,!,,)- Fu(!,,)- qJAid) , (6) 
and M 11 = (1- a)[v(ld ,!,,)- c(l ,, )]- qJ11 (!,,). 
If a is close to one there might be the case that the upstream manager is always better 
off not producing, his level of effort will always be in non-participation domain, especially 
when c(J,,) - C(J,,) is very small. 
The first order conditions are: 
av(111,Jd) -(l - a )av(I,,J d) _ aFAI,,,Jd) = BqJAIJ for the downstream manager, (7) 
a1d aid aid aitl 
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av(I 1 ) oc(I ) om (1 ) 
(1-a)( "' d - " ) = ru " for the upstream manager. 
8111 of,, o1u 
(8) 
The solutions for FOC (4) and (5) are Md's best-response function,Id NP (IJ and 
M 's best-response function 1 (1 1). Both investment levels are also functions of the joint u , u ( 





Since the upstream manager has the comparative advantage in producing the 
intermediate output and his relationship-specific investment pays off more when the manager 
participates in production, nonparticipation of M,, results in higher cost of production and 
lower value of output. These factors combined with the nature of joint ownership lead to 
functions for both managers up as compared to the first-best outcome (Figures 4 and 5). 
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I,, 




Figure 5. The upstream manager' s investment level when he does not participate. 
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The intuition for underinvestment of I11 and Id is the following. M u does not take into 
consideration Md's payoff, his own payoff function does not depend on his participation , 
M,, gets a smaller share of net profit [v(Id,J,,)-c(l., )] and hence he invests too little 
V/P (1d ) < 1,~8 (Id)). If Md invests more, he would increase net profit of the joint venture, but 
his payoff would be higher only by a *increase in net profit, the rest of the gain goes to Mu. 
Since Md does not take into account Mu's payoff he underinvests (1/P(I,,) < 1; 8 (1,,)). 
The intersection of the best-response functions gives a unique pair of V., (a),J/P (a)] for 
a E (0.5, 1). 1
11 
(a) and I/P (a) are solutions if they satisfy Gd < 0. 
The solutions for FOC (7) and (8) are the downstream manager's best-response 
function, Id P (Ju) and the upstream manager's best-response function, I,, (Id P). The 
relationship-specific investments are also functions of a . Response function for the 
upstream manager is the as in the case of non-participation, however, for the downstream 
manager it is different in both cases. Both response functions have positive slopes. 
+ + 
D= 
a2v(I11 ,IJ -(1-a) a2v(!u,1J _ a2FA1u,1d ) 
aida1., aida1,, a1da1,, 
0 
a2 v(Iu ,Id) - (1- a) a2v(Iu ,Id) 82 FAiu ,Id) - a2<pAid) > . 
a1/ a1/ a1/ a1,/ 
+ + 
I assume that marginal value of the investment (intem1ediate good) will be higher 
when both managers participate in production, 
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Mu participates, and vise versa. The marginal value of M,, 's investment will increase with 
increase in Md's investment, and this increase will be higher in participation case, 
ai v (I,, ,1 d) (J2 v(/,, ,Id) ---"------"- > . 
a1,,a1d a1,,a1" 
l' NP 
From the (4) and (5), for the same level of I,, I d > Id , as 
avu J d) avu J ,) · ·ft fi b h. __ ;;..." ____;:;__ > u 1 • Md's function shi s up compared to the irst-best outcome, ut t 1s 
ai d a1" 
shift is smaller than in the case of Mu's nonparticipation. FOC(/,~ )11:1' > 0, so, given 1,,, 




Figure 6. The downstream manager's investment level when he is the owner of the 
controlling stock. 
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For given a we can have several possible outcomes: 
no solution in Gd < 0 , only participation solution (Figure 7); 
no solution in Gd > 0, only non-participation solution (Figure 8); 
both solutions may occur (Figure 9). 
Since the downstream manager bas different response functions in different domains, 
his payoff function is not globally concave. That gives as a possibility of multiple 
equilibrium in this subgarne, i.e. for the same a participation and non-participation can be 
the solutions. This implies that there is also a third solution, which is a mix-strategy solution 













Figure 8. The subgame (Md is owner) non-participation solution. 
! ,, 
1,,8 
If ti !/ 
Figure 9. The subgame ( M " is owner) multiple solu tion. 
I,,(!cJ 
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Given the set of solutions for the individual payoffs maximization in non-participation case, 
a is chosen such that total payoff, W NP (a) , is maximized and 
a[v{l/P ,1J-c(!J]- F)1/ P,JJ- qJd(J/P ) ~ O; 
(1 - a)[v(Id NP ,1
11 
)- c(I,, )]- qJ
11 
(!J ~ 0. 
Given the set of solutions for the individual payoffs max imization in partic ipation case, a is 
chosen such that total payoff, WP(a) , is maximized and 
v{1/ ,1J-c(1J-(1- a)[v{l/ ,1J-c(IJ]- FA1/ ,1J- r;,(1J-qJd(I/ ) ~ O; 
(1 - a)[v(1/ ,1J- c(IJ]- qJ" (IJ ~ 0. 
For each a E (0.5,l]there can be different sets of investments which lead to different 
payoffs. Managers will choose a which gives the highest total payoff, 
max[w NP (a) , WP (a) ]. This ownership structure will be the Nash equi librium of the 
subgame. 
3.4. The Manager of the Upstream Firm Owns Controlling Stock of the Joint Venture 
In stage one the upstream manager acquires controlling stock of the joint venture. In 
stage two both managers make relationship-specific investments. Tn the third stage of the 
model only the upstream manager makes the decision. Given the levels of I 11 and Id , he 
decides whether he needs M d' s participation or not. Jflhe upstream manager needs M d 's 
participation in production, he makes an offer, p, to the downstream manager. Finally both 
firms claim their shares of the joint venture' s profit. 
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Mu 's decision depends on the participation constraint, Gu . The participation 
constraint is the locus that separates two domains (the domain where participation is optimal 
and the domain where non-participation is optimal) and is the difference between gains from 
Md 's participation and cost of his participation. G,, = [v(l",1,,)- v(l" ,Iu)]- F'Ald, I,, ). 
The solution for the case when M,, is the owner may be found in two different 




Figure I 0. Domain I - Md does not participate, Domain II - Md participates. 
3 The participation constraint is flatter than payments function ( ls!opeGu I < lsiopePI) and is always 
positioned below (PIG,, < 0 ). It gives the third domain where P<O and G.;>O. To ensure that P is always 
positive, new equations should be introduced into the model. 
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The participation constraint is negatively slopped. 
+ + 
8V(Iu,ld) av(!., ,Id) aFd(lu/J 
a1d a1d a1d o 
slopeG11 = - ( ) ov(l
11 
,Id) oFJI,JJ < . av 1,,,1d 
8111 aru aid 
+ + 
The upstream manager induces the downstream manager to participate when G,, > 0, 
M
11 
is indifferent between keeping Md and letting him go when G,, = 0, and M11 does not 
want M ,1 to participate when G11 < 0. 
The upstream manager does not want Md 's participation when the gains from Md's 
participation are lower than Md's cost of participation, [v(Id,1,,)-v(l,"I,,)] < FAI",J,,) . G,, 
depends on the ownership structure only indirectly, through the relationship-specific 
investments. 
If J 11 and Id are chosen such that G11 < 0, M,,does not want Md's participation or 
believes that M 11 is always going to reject his offer (Figure I, node ill). M 11 does not offer 
the downstream manager the payment for his service. M
11 
does not participate in production 
and does not incur additional cost FAl
11
,Id) related to production process. He gets hi.s share 
of the total payoff in the last stage. Mu hires a new manager for the downstream firm . 
Since Md has comparative advantage in producing final good v(l" ,!,,) :s; V(Id ,!,,) . M
11 
maximizes his payoff subject to M t1 nonparticipation. 
The ex ante non-participation payoffs are: 
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M/P = (1- a)[v(Id ,Ju)- C(lu )] -F,, (! ,, )-rp,, (!,,) , 
Md =a[v(Id,I,,)-c(1,,)] -rpd(Jd). 





and Id are chosen such that G
11 
> 0, M,, induces Md to participate (Figure 1, 
node IV). The ex ante participation payoffs are: 
payment is set such that Md always gets his reservation utility, i.e. Md's payoff function is 
the same in case of participation and nonparticipation. So, 
M ,, r = V(Id ,I,,)- C(I,,)- a[v(Id JJ- C(I,,)] -FAid J,,) - F,, (1,,)-rpu (IJ , (13) 
Md =a[v(Id,I,,)-c(I,,)]-rpd (Id). 
The first order conditions are: 
av(I,,Jd) _ ac(I,,) _a(av(1,,Jd) _ ac(1,,)) - aFAI,,JJ _ aF,, (I,,) = arp11 (1 ,,) 
a1,, a1,, a1,, a1
11 




The solution forFOC ( 11 ) and (12) are Md's best-response function,JAIJ and 
Mu 's best-response function,/
11 
NP U t1 ), while the solution to (14) is the best-response 
function, I / (Id) , if M
11 
induces Md to participate. Both investment levels are also 
functions of the joint venture stock share, a . 
Both managers underinvest as compare to the first-best outcome. The same argument 
as above applies. The downstream manager has comparative advantage in producing final 
output and his relationship-specific investment pays off more when the manager participates 
in production, so nonparticipation of Md results in lower value of output. Md does not take 
into consideration M
11 
's payoff, his own payoff function does not depend on his 
participation, M d gets smaller share of net profit [v(ld,IJ- c(!J] and hence he invests too 
little (1A1J < 1;8 (!J) . If M
11 
invests more, he would increase net profit of the joint venture, 
but his payoff would be increased only by (I - a) *increase in net profit, the rest of the gain 
goes to Md . Since Mu does not take into account Md's payoff he underinvests 
(1/P (!J < I,':8 (1d)). 
The intersection of the best-response functions gives a unique pair of[! 
11 
NP (a),J d (a)] for 
a E (0, 0.5) . l / P (a) and Id (a) are solutions if they satisfy G,, < 0. 
The solution forFOC (14) and (15) are Md's best-response function,JAJ,,) and 
M,, ' s best-response function, /
11 
P (!" ). Both investment levels are also functions of the joint 
venture stock share, a. The outcomes under different types of joint ownership are illustrated 
in Figures 11 and 12. 
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!/ 1/B 
Figure 11. The downstream manager's best-response :functions w1der different ownership 
structures. 
I NP II 1,/ [ FB II '" 
Figure 12. The upstream manager' s best response :functions under different ownership 
structures. 
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NP p FB M fun . 1 . ft d h Forthesamelevelof Id !
11 
< i " < l r1 . 11 's cttons11 sup compare tote 
first-best outcome, but thjs shift is smaller than in the case of nonparticipation. 
For given a we can have several possible outcomes: 
no solution in Gu < 0, only participation solution; 
no solution in G
11 
> 0, only non-participation solution; 
both solutions may occur. 
Since the upstream manager has different response functions in different domruns, rus 
payoff function is not globally concave. That gives as a possibility of multiple equilibrium 
in this subgame, i.e. for the same a participation and non-participation can be the solutions. 
This implies that there is also a third solution, which is a mix-strategy solution. 
Given the set of solutions for the individual payoffs maximization in non-
participation case, a is chosen such that total payoff, W NP (a) , is maximized and 
(1- a)[v(id ' Ju NP )- c(J" NP )]- F,, (1 u NP )- {fJ" (!" NP ) + Tu Uu) ~ 0 ' 
Given the set of solutions for the individual payoffs maximization in participation case, a 1s 
chosen such that total payoff, W P (a), is maximized and 
v(!",1"P )- c(1 .. P )- a[v(Id,IuP )- c(1 .. P )]-F" (1d, l 11 P )- F,, (! .. fl )- rp11 (/,/ ) ~ 0 and 
a[v(I",J/ )-c{i/ )]-q;AI") ~ O. 
For each a e (0, 0.5) there can be different sets of investments which lead to different 
payoffs. Managers will choose a which gives the highest total payoff, 
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max[w NP (a),WP (a) ]. This ownership structure wi ll be the Nash equilibrium of the 
subgame. 
Each sub game has Nash equilibrium that yields the highest total payoff. The Nash 
equilibrium of the game is the ownership structure that gives arg max[WP (a), W NP (a)]. 
a 
For example, if WP (a)= (Md (a)+ M /(a)) is chosen, then Mu will have 
controlling stock of the joint venture, will induce Md to participate in production, and that 
will make both managers better off. 
3.5. General Results 
When finns have liquidity constraints, e.g. capital and asset markets imperfections, 
initial allocation of property rights have a substantial effect on the ex post economic 
performance of the enterprises. Given the assumptions of the model , the joint ownership 
structure is likely to be optimal for the vertically integrated firms with complimentary assets 
and essential investments in human and physical capital. 
If the model does not al low side payments, the managers would just exchange their 
shares of the finns and interior solution for a , i.e. a E (o, 1), would be driven mostly by 
liquidity constraint. Since the model assumes some side payments between managers during 
the allocation of property rights, the interior solution is due to the structure of the model. The 
result is determined by the complimentarity of the assets and investments, and the fact that ex 
ante and ex post payoffs of the firms are interdependent on the levels of managers 
investments. 
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Under any type of joint ownership managers will underinvest in the relationship-
specific investments as compare to the first-best outcome. Any change in the ownership 
structure that leads to increase in I ,, (or Id) without decreasing Id (or I,,) is good, since 
such change moves firms closer to the first-best and the total payoff rises. As opposed to the 
Hart's model, some choices of the investment can lead to nonparticipation of one of the 
managers even when both managers have comparative advantage in running their firms. 
Without further information about the importance of M ,, 's investment relative to 
Md's investment it is not possible to find what type of the joint ownership structure is 
preferable. That is also interesting to see how the results will change with change in the 
relative importance of the investments. 
In the next section we introduce particular functional forms to define the relative 
importance of I ,, and Id . The solution for the model and the sensitivity analysis are also 
presented. 
3.6. Specified Model 
To find the optimal ownership structure and analyze how the choice of the structure is 
affected by changes in the relative importance of I ,, and Id, we use particular functional 
forms for the model. 
For the simplicity we assume that all functions are quadratic. This ensures the linearity of the 
FOC's. 




and cpd(ld) = I /; 
V(/11 ,Id )= 2/d + 111 - 0.4(111 
2 
- 0.7 !Jd + ! / ) + 2 ; 
v(J
11





- 0.31,,fd +!/ ) + 2. 
Since Md produces final output and has a comparative advantage in such production 




,Id) "C. v(/11 ,fd ) for V ! ,, and Id, because 
investments become relatively unproductive when one of the managers does not participate. 
For example, M,, knows his firm better than outside person, and even if a new manager's 
qualification is the same as M
11 
's, the value of the intermediate output will be lower because 
the outside manager is not as familiar with the production process as M 
11 
• 
C(/11 ) = 0.81/ - 2J11 + 2; 
c(!ll ) = ! ,, 2 - 2Ju + 2 ; 
c(IJ 2 C(IJ for V !
11
, the same argument as above applies to justify this choice of 
functional forms for costs. 
FAJ11 ,Jd) = 0.5111 
2 












, Id) , F
11 
(!,, ) and the interaction term in the value functions and Fd are going to be the 
key determinants of the final outcome. 
First-Best: 
The maximization of (1) with respect to J
11 
and I d gives the first-best investment 
levels, Id =0.85888 and J
11 
=0.93098; total payoff=2. l208 
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Case 1: M d is the owner of controlling stock. 
If the downstream manager does not want the upstream manager to participate he 
maximizes (2) with respect to Id and M u maximizes (3) witb respect to Ju. These 
investments are chosen non-cooperatively and simultaneously. 
The results of maximization are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6. M d is the owner, M
11 
does not participate. The model results. 
a Id l ,, M NP M P M u Total Gd d d 
0.6 0.39752 0.35993 0.63508 0.69017 0.49028 1.1254 >O 
0.7 0.40114 0.30159 0.6852 0.67792 0.34213 1.0273 <O 
0.8 0.39752 0.2276 0.66292 0.57447 0.20418 0.8671 <O 
0.9 0.38426 0.13103 0.519 0.32336 0.00853 0.6043 <O 
M /P and M u are payoffs fo r given Id ,1
11 
and a. The sign of Gd is checked to 
val idate that the choice of investments is in correct region. Also, it is necessary to calculate 
whether M /P (Mu does not participate and both managers assume that) is the best response 
to the chosen level of l u. This is done by considering M / response function. M / is the 




assuming non-participation. M 
11 
's ex post reservation is determined by c(JJ, and 
consistency holds only if M d is worse off by making M
11 
participate. So, Md NP is relevant 





Figure 13. Non-participation solution. 
For a = 0.6 the choice of investment does not satisfy participation constraint 
(Gd > 0) and M /P is not a valid solution since M" is better off making Mu participate, 
M /P < M / . a = 0.7, a = 0.8 and a = 0.9 are relevant solutions. The choice of 
investments is in correct region for non-participation ( G" < 0 ), and M /" > M /. When M t1 
is the owner of controlling stock, non-participation of M
11 
will occur when M t1 has 70% or 
more of the joint venture stock. 
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If Md wants Mu to participate and offers him the payment, Md maximizes (6) with 
respect to 1 d and M u maximizes (3) with respect to 1
11 
• The investments are chosen non-
cooperatively and simultaneously. 
The results of maximization are presented in Table 7. 
To check whether M/ (M
11 
participates and both managers assume that) is the best 
response to the chosen level of 1
11
, consider M /P . M/P is the best-response function for 
Md when he assumes non-participation of Mu while M u chooses I u assuming participation. 
M/ is relevant solution only if M/P < M/ . 
Table 7. Md is the owner, M
11 
participates. The model results. 
a Id Ju p M NP MP Mu Total Gd d d 
0.55 0.47569 0.38712 0.00033 0.59526 0.67918 0.61791 1.2971 >O 
0.6 0.47861 0.36219 0.00325 0.63849 0.69645 0.53522 1.2317 >O 
0.7 0.47915 0.30341 0.00967 0.68867 0.68366 0.37416 1.0578 >O 
0.8 0.47119 0.2289 0.17239 0.66602 0.57917 0.22421 1.0034 <O 
0.9 0.45197 0.13171 0.26751 0.52101 0.32621 0.00945 0.42073 <O 
For a = 0.9 and a = 0.8 the choice of investment does not satisfy participation 
constraint (Gd < 0) and M d Pis not a valid solution since M d is better off without M 
11 
's 
participation, M d NP > Md P. a = 0.6 is relevant solution. The choice of investments is in 
correct region for participation (Gd > 0 ), and Md NP < M d P . a = 0. 7 is not a relevant 




will occur when M J has 70% or less of the joint venture stock. Since a = 0.55 gives 
highest total payoff, this ownership structure will be optimal for the " M d -owner" subgarne. 
Case 2: M 
11 
is the owner of controlling stock. 
If the upstream manager does not want the downstream manager to participate he 
maximizes (9) with respect to 1
11 
and Md maximizes (10) with respect to I" . 1
11 
and I" are 
chosen non-cooperatively and simultaneously. 
The results are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8. M 
11 
is the owner, M" does not participate. The model results. 
a Id I ., M NP MP M d Total G., 
II u 
0.4 0.32407 0.57859 0.762 0.87707 0.61869 1.3807 >O 
0.3 0.25935 0.59992 0.86837 0.9248 0.45058 1.319 >O 
0.25 0.22357 0.6093 0.90774 0.9285 0.36845 1.2762 >O 
0.2 0.1852 0.61791 0.9358 0.9161 0.28835 1.2242 <O 
0.1 0.009963 0.63291 0.94987 0.83297 0.1365 1.0864 <O 
The choice of investments is in the correct region (Gd < 0 ) for a = 0.2 and a = 0.1. 
Payoff M
11 
NI' ( M d does not participate and both managers assume that) is the best-response 
function for these ownership structure, M NP > M " , where M J> is the function for M u u u u 




wants M d's participation, he offers the payment and maximizes (13) with 
respect to Ju , M d maximizes (10) with respect to Id. Ju and Id are chosen non-
cooperatively and simultaneously. 
The results are presented in Table 9. 
Table 9. M
11 
is the owner, M " participates. The model results. 
a ! ti 1 11 p M NP M P M d Total G,, 
II II 
0.45 0.35833 0.69119 0.0812 0.70189 0.84542 0.31375 1.5473 >O 
0.4 0.328 0.68679 0.0591 0.76581 0.8849 0.26429 1.1492 >O 
0.3 0.26156 0.67602 0.0221 0.87104 0.92986 0.17389 1.1038 >O 
0.25 0.22507 0.66958 0.00805 0.90975 0.93217 0.13364 1.0658 >O 
0.2 0.18612 0.6624 -0.0026 0.93716 0.9185 0.0972 1.0157 <O 
0.1 0.0998 0.64557 -0.0116 0.95013 0.8334 0.0377 0.87114 <O 
Since a = 0.45 is valid solution and gives the highest total payoff, this ownership 
structure is the Nash equilibrium of the" Mu -owner" subgarne. The closer a is to 0.5 the 
higher is the total payoff. 
a = 0.45 yields the highest of all total payoffs in the game, 
argmax[l.5473, 1.0273, 0.8671, 0.6043, 1.2317, 1.0578, 1.2242, 1.0864, 1.1492, 1.1038, 1.0658] 
a 
So, in equilibrium the upstream manager will own 55% of the joint venture and will induce 
the downstream manager to participate in production process. 
Both managers have incentives to invest more since they share final surplus. The 
controlling stock -owner's incentive (Mu's incentives) to make relationship-specific 
investment increases because he receive a greater ex post payoff created by such investment. 
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When M,, 's investments is relatively more important than Md's investments, the 
optimal ownership structure is when M,, is the owner. When Md's investments is relatively 
more important, the optimal ownership structure is when he is the owner of controlling stock. 
To show this I modify the modeJ by changing interaction terms in value functions. New 
v(J u ,Id)= 21 d + 1 u - 0.8(/u 2 - 0.21 J d + I /)+ 2 . All other functions stay the same. 
The first-best outcome is: I d = 0.8346, Ju= 0.9119 , and total payoff=2.0584. 
The valid solutions for the new model are presented in Tables 10 and 11. 
Table 10. M d is the owner of controlling stock 
a Id Ju p M NP M p Mu Total Gd d d 
0.55 0.46898 0.3826 0.00853 0.582 17 0.65857 0.60738 1.266 >O 
0.6 0.47209 0.35762 0.03727 0.62479 0.67561 0.52633 1.2019 >O 
0.7 0.47331 0.29958 0.10056 0.67466 0.66360 0.36844 1.0320 >O 
0.7 0.39652 0.29839 --- 0.67243 0.65988 0.33729 1.0097 <O 
0.8 0.3938 0.22522 --- 0.65 153 0.55912 0.20169 0.8532 <O 
0.9 0.3820 0.12971 --- 0.51147 0.3 1362 0.08458 0.5961 <O 
The Nash equilibrium of this model is a= 0.55. The downstream manager owns 
55% of the stock and induces the upstrean1 manager to participate by offering him the 
payment for his service. 
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Table 11. M ,, is the owner of controlling stock 
a Id I,, p M NP 
p 
Md Total G,, 
" 
M,, 
0.4 0.31952 0.68017 0.05433 0.74872 0.85752 0.25488 l.1124 >O 
0.3 0.25492 0.67069 0.01944 0.85455 0.90505 0.16828 l.0733 >O 
0.2 0.18091 0.61568 --- 0.92229 0.89719 0.28607 1.2084 <O 
0.1 0.09727 0.63163 --- 0.94122 0.82141 0.13587 1.0771 <O 
Participation decision depends on the level of I d and 111 • Some choices of 
investments can lead to nonparticipation solution even when both managers have 
comparative advantage in runni.ng their firms. To show this I increase the downstream 
manager' s cost of participation, FAl,,,Jd) . The nontransferable cost function for Md is now 
v(/
11
, Id)= 21 d + !
11 
- 0.8(1,, 2 - 0.21,,I d +Id 2 ) + 2. All other functions are the same as in the 
basic model. The first-best outcome is: Id= 0.7043 , 1
11 
= 0.8121, and total payoff=l.7284. 
The valid solutions for the new model are presented in Tables 12 and 13. 
Table 12. M 
11 
is the owner of controlling stock 
a Id I,, p M NP 
p 
M d Total G,, 
" 
M,, 
0.4 0.3188 0.6487 0.0062 0.7480 0.7502 0.2433 0.9934 >O 
0.3 0.2535 0.5970 --- 0.8527 0.8183 0.4459 1.2987 <O 
0.2 0.1809 0.6157 --- 0.9223 0.8384 0.2861 1.2084 <O 
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Table 13. M d is the owner of controJling stock 
a Id Ju p M NP 
p M ., Total Gd d M" 
0.55 0.4218 0.3823 0.0172 0.5068 0.5713 0.5787 1.1500 >O 
0.6 0.4288 0.3568 0.0444 0.5535 0.59306 0.5032 1.0962 >O 
0.7 0.3672 0.2979 --- 0.6147 0.5906 0.3247 0.9394 <O 
0.8 0.3724 0.2249 --- 0.6079 0.5072 0.1956 0.8035 <O 
0.9 0.3701 0.1296 --- 0.4869 0.2846 0.0829 0.5697 <O 
The Nash equilibrium is a = 0.3 , the upstream manager owns 70% of joint venture 's 
stock, the downstream manager does not participates in production and just receives his share 
of the joint venture profit. 
If the model is fully symmetric and there are no interaction terms, the results are 
likely to be similar to Hart model. The party with more important investment or human 
capital has ownership rights, i.e. acquires the other firm. 
The important results of the presented model are: 
joint ownership is optimal when the investment of one manager benefits another 
manager regardless of his participation in production process; 
there are some choices of relationship-speci fi e investments that lead to 
nonparticipation of one of the managers being optimal; 
the interior solution for a is driven by the structure of the model. The less 
important Mu ' s investment relative to M" 's investment (and vice versa) and the 
higher is the cost of participation, the more I ikely the owner will have more than 
55% of the joint venture's stock. 
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION 
Russia started extended privatization refonns in late 1991. There are cases when 
privatized enterprises have not outperformed production and efficiency levels of pre-
privatization period. Literature on privatization firmly favors private to public ownership, 
although one question remains unanswered: "what type of ownership structure is most 
preferred for privatized enterprises?" ls it the most efficient to transfer an enterprise into 
single hands or should a joint ownership be estabhshed? 
The Russian economy is characterized by asset market failures and capital market 
imperfections. The initial allocation of property rights can have a substantial effect on future 
economic performance of enterprises. Joint ventures emerge all the time in Russia. One of 
the reasons is that with capital and asset market imperfections enterprises have liquidity 
constraints, they do not have access to unlimited money resources and ownership cannot 
change hands easily. So firms just exchange the shares of their enterprises and create joint 
ventures since they do not usually have option of buying each other. 
This thesis focuses on ex post efficiency of vertically integrated enterprises under 
different ownership structures, given that complete contingent contracts cannot be written. 
Unforeseen contingencies, unverifiable terms, costs of enforcement, and a lack of common 
language all contribute to contracts being incomplete. These characteristics of contracts 
provide incentives to acquire ownership, since ownership is a source of power when 
contracts are in dispute and is a way of securing residual property rights. We use incomplete 
contract approach to the choice of ownership structure after privatization, and consider 
transition economy of Russia with vertically integrated industry producing private goods. 
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The model largely builds on lhe classical treatment of residual rights approach to ownership 
by Hart (1995). 
In the model we make a number of assumptions, including: complete contracts cannot 
be written, asset and capital markets are imperfect, and payoff of the firms are interdependent 
on levels of managers' investments. The ownership may change hands if managers sign the 
contract on creating a joint venture. In this case both managers have the incentives to invest 
more since they share final surplus. Hart stated that if the investments are embodied in the 
human capital, the same person should own the strictly complimentary assets (or assets 
should not be jointly owned). When investments are embodied in physical assets rather than 
human assets, it is no longer clear. We look at the joint ownership structure where both 
managers have a share of the enterprise. Finn's assets are complimentary and the 
relationship-specific investments may be investments in physical capital. Whether the 
manager produces or not he gets his share of the joint venture 's profit. Given these 
assumptions, joint ownership for vertically integrated enterprises with complimentary assets 
and essential investments in human and physical capital is optimal. As opposed to Hart's 
model, some choices of the relationship-specific investments can lead to nooparticipation 
solution even when both managers have comparative advantage in running their firms. 
If the model does not allow side payments, the managers would just exchange their 
shares of the firms and an interior solution for a, i.e. a E {o, t) , would be driven mostly by 
liquidity constraint. Since the model assumes some side payments between managers during 
the allocation of property rights, the interior solution is due to the structure of the model. The 
result is determined by the complementarity of the assets and investments, and the fact that 
ex ante and ex post payoffs of the firms are interdependent on the levels of managers 
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investments. So, for Russian economy the joint ownership may be not only a necessity but 
also an optimal way of allocating ownership rights. 
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